How Bad is Corruption?:Cross-country Evidence of the Impact of Corruption on Economic Prosperity by Bentzen, Jeanet Sinding
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
How Bad is Corruption?
Bentzen, Jeanet Sinding
Published in:
Review of Development Economics
DOI:
10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00653.x
Publication date:
2012
Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Bentzen, J. S. (2012). How Bad is Corruption? Cross-country Evidence of the Impact of Corruption on Economic
Prosperity. Review of Development Economics, 16(1), 164-187. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9361.2011.00653.x
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
How Bad is Corruption? Cross-country Evidence of
the Impact of Corruption on Economic Prosperityrode_653 167..184
Jeanet Sinding Bentzen*
Abstract
Most people today would argue that corruption is bad for countries’ economic development.Yet, we still lack
a reliable empirical estimate of the effect.This study addresses the econometric shortcomings of the literature
and provides an estimate of the causal impact of corruption on gross domestic product per capita across
countries. Certain dimensions of a country’s culture are used as instruments for corruption. These instru-
ments stay strong when the other deep determinants of economic development, geography, and the
remaining dimensions of institutions and culture are controlled for. In the process of choosing controls,
however, the entire set of variables available in the Quality of Governance online database (QOG) that
includes all central variables from the literature on institutions and culture are included. It is found that
corruption does exert a significant and negative impact on countries’ productivity levels.
1. Introduction
Most of us agree that corruption is a government failure that one would like to
eliminate (see Leff (1964) for a counter argument), but how bad is it really? It is
important to get a sense of the severity of the problem in order to be able to prioritize
which government inefficiencies to fight first. Mauro (1995) provided an empirical
estimate of the impact of corruption on investments and growth. Using the instrument
variables approach, he aimed at solving the obvious endogeneity issues: Not only does
economic performance influence corruption, but countries performing better might
also have more resources to combat corruption. Also, other factors might influence
both corruption and economic performance. Mauro found that corruption reduces
investments and thereby economic growth. However, Mauro’s study has two econo-
metric shortcomings that the present paper tries to deal with.
Mauro’s instrument for corruption was ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF). The
idea is that bureaucrats may favor members of their own ethnolinguistic group and
corruption is expected to be higher the higher the degree of ELF in a country. However,
the assumption of exclusion restrictions does not hold: ELF might be correlated with
other determinants of growth that are excluded from the analysis (Acemoglu et al.,
2001). For instance, Easterly and Levine (1997) argued that ELF can influence perform-
ance by creating political instability. La Porta et al. (1999) showed that countries closer
to the equator are more ethnolinguistically fractionalized than countries further away.
If, for example, political instability and distance to the equator influence growth, ELF
is an invalid instrument. Indeed, it seems that these factors do influence growth (East-
erly and Levine, 1997; Gallup et al., 1999; Sachs, 2003).
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To alleviate this problem, one could include controls for geography and political
instability in Mauro’s regressions. The second econometric problem then arises,
however: ELF becomes a weak instrument when including other determinants of
economic outcomes in Mauro’s regressions.
These issues are addressed by providing new instruments for corruption, namely
cultural values of individualism and power distances. The idea is that corruption tends
to be higher in cultures that encourage individuals to prioritize loyalty towards one’s
social group above the individual itself (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), i.e. in cultures with
lower rates of individualism. Another dimension of culture that influences the level of
corruption is what Hofstede (2001) termed “power distances,” or termed “hierarchy” by
Schwartz (1999, 2004). A worker in a culture with large power distances prefers large
distances between the people in power and himself. These societies end up being more
hierarchical and also tend to be more corrupt.These two dimensions of culture are used
here as instruments for corruption in cross-country regressions on gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita.
However, these culture dimensions might be correlated with other factors that
influence GDP per capita.This would render them invalid as instruments (the exclusion
restrictions would not hold). Since there are two instruments, the overidentification
(OID) test can be used to test this. In all regressions, this test accepts that corruption is
the only channel through which these particular culture dimensions influence GDP per
capita. While this is encouraging, it does not prove anything, since the OID test is a test
of low power, meaning that it accepts “too many” wrong hypotheses (Wooldridge,
2002). Hence, whether the effect of corruption on economic prosperity can be esti-
mated, hinges on whether it is possible to control for all relevant covariates. Note that
it does not matter for the validity of the instruments that factors influencing culture
have been omitted, as long as these factors do not influence GDP per capita. Hence, if
one can control for everything with a bearing on GDP per capita, the exclusion
restrictions hold. In order to choose these relevant controls, the framework of “deep
determinants” of economic prosperity is relied upon (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Hall and
Jones, 1999; Licht et al., 2007; Rodrik, 2004). The idea is that deep determinants of
development such as institutions, geography, and culture affect proximate factors such
as technological progress and investments in human and physical capital, which then
determine the level of GDP per capita. Applied to the present paper; if the framework
of deep determinants captures the entire variation in economic development, any link
between culture and economic development can be accounted for, provided that one
possesses measures of all these deep determinants. In other words; if institutions,
geography, and culture exhaust the list of possible deep determinants, one is left only to
find good measures of these dimensions.
In order to reduce the degrees of freedom in choosing these control variables,
included are all measures of institutions and culture available in a large online dataset
provided by the Quality of Government Institute, encompassing all central measures
from the literature (Teorell et al., 2009).
Another concern, that one might have, is that the instruments could be influenced by
the level of GDP per capita. However, this should not be a problem when using these
particular culture measures, since they are from 1967 and 1973 (with an extension in
2001), whereas GDP and corruption are from 2006. Furthermore, Hofstede’s culture
measures are based on interviews of a group of people rather similar across countries,
namely IBM workers. This makes the measures not so representative for a particular
country’s culture, but very suitable for value comparisons across countries, as they are
rather independent of demographics, income, etc. Nevertheless, empirical evidence is
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provided showing that culture is, indeed, exogenous to the level of economic develop-
ment. Specifically, an instrument is used for individualism provided by Licht et al.
(2007); pronoun drop. The reasoning is that the language of less individualist cultures
evolves to drop the pronoun (I, she, they, etc.), since the individual is less important
compared with more individualist countries.
This study differs from Mauro’s in one last aspect. By linking corruption to growth
rates of GDP per capita, Mauro explains the transitional dynamics towards steady state.
Instead, Hall and Jones (1999) stressed that the level of GDP per capita should be
employed if the purpose is to explain the long run differences in economic performance
(Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004).As this paper analyses the level of GDP per
capita, the conclusions thus concern long run differences and not short run dynamics.
2. Framework: Deep Determinants of Economic Prosperity
This paper follows a broad literature seeking the fundamental causes of long run
development (Rodrik et al., 2004). According to neoclassical growth theory, cross-
country income differences arise from a combination of differences in the rates of
technological progress and physical and human capital investment. More recently,
authors have raised the deeper question:“Why is it that some countries do not improve
their technology, invest more in physical capital, and accumulate more human capital?”
(Hall and Jones, 1999). There must be some reasons underneath that prevent countries
from improving the proximate causes of economic development. The literature has
broadly agreed on three such reasons: institutions (corruption, contracting institutions,
and property rights institutions) (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Hall and Jones, 1999), geo-
graphy (Sachs, 2003), and culture (Guiso et al., 2006; Tabellini, 2010).1 This framework
is consistent with a regression line of the form:2
GDPCAP CORRUPT GEO CULTURE INSTi i i i i i= + + + + +β β β β β ε0 1 2 2 4 , (1)
where b1 is the parameter of interest in the present paper. Institutions have been split
into corruption, CORRUPT, and remaining institutions, INST. GDPCAPi is real GDP
per capita in country i, GEO is a vector of geographical factors, and CULTURE is a
vector of culture dimensions.
If institutions, geography, and culture span the entire set of deep determinants of
economic prosperity, regressions of type (1) will explain the entire variation in GDP
per capita across countries. Hence, in the perfect world, where we have perfect data, we
would expect an R2 of 100%. This is obviously a rather naïve assumption, but in the
empirical analysis an explanatory power of the model of around 80% is obtained. If the
“deep determinants” framework is true, the deviation from 100% is simply due to
measurement error.
3. Data
GDP Per Capita
GDP per capita is from Heston et al.’s (2009) Penn world Tables (PWT). Real GDP per
capita is used from PWT version 6.3 (the measure called rgdpl2) in 2006. 2006 is not the
most recent year, but the most recent year might be subject to more measurement
error.
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Corruption
The measure of corruption used in the main regressions is control of corruption in 2006
(cci2006) by Kaufmann et al. (2009). The index runs from -2.5 to 2.5, where lower
values indicate less control of corruption, meaning more corruption.This index includes
various measures of corruption, which might reduce the scope for measurement error.
Remaining Institutions
The Quality of Governance (QOG) dataset by Teorell et al. (2009) provides a long list
of measures of institutions, gathered from some of the most central research. Acemoglu
and Johnson (2005) defined institutions as encompassing property rights institutions
and contracting institutions. Some authors also included rule of law (Licht et al., 2007).
Therefore, this paper includes all institutional measures from QOG, except measures of
labor market institutions, which gives a total of 23 measures in addition to corruption
(described in Web Appendix A1).3 As contracting institutions were not included in the
QOG dataset, two measures of contracting institutions used by Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005) have been added; “number of procedures” and “procedural complexity,” also
described in Web Appendix A1.
Geography
Regional dummies capture a large share of the variation in geography. The ones used
here are by World Development Indicators: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia
(SOA), East Asia & Pacific (EAP), Latin America & Caribbean (LAC), Middle East &
North Africa (MENA), North America (NA), and Europe & Central Asia (ECA). The
results are unchanged when using instead continent dummies. Other measures of
geography: absolute latitude, landarea in km2, a dummy for whether the country is
landlocked, the share of the total area that lies within the tropics, a dummy for whether
some part of the country lies within the tropics, elevation (mean meters above sea
level), mean distance to coast, mean distance to river, mean distance to coast or river.
Hofstede Culture Measures
The measures of culture that are used as instruments for corruption are from Hofstede
(2001).4 Hofstede performed value surveys of a group of people, similar across coun-
tries, namely IBM employees. This makes his survey suitable for value comparisons
across countries, as opposed to studies such as World Values Survey, which are more
suitable for obtaining representative measures of culture within a country. From the
value surveys, Hofstede developed a model that identifies five primary dimensions to
differentiate cultures. The first is power distances (PDI) which is the degree to which
inequality in the distribution of power is accepted and expected in a society.The second
is individualism (IDV), the extent to which a society reinforces individual or collective
achievement. The three remaining dimensions are described in Web Appendix A1. The
value surveys of the IBM workers were performed in 1967 and 1973 with an extension
in 2001.
Remaining Culture
In addition to the Hofstede measures, 26 measures of culture were gathered from the
QOG dataset. All religious, language, and colonial origin variables, which have been
argued to be proxies for culture, were added. All are described in Web Appendix A1.
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4. OLS Estimation
Panel A of Table 1 provides ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation
(1), regressing 2006 real GDP per capita on corruption and the various deep
determinants.
Table 1. OLS and IV (TSLS) Estimates of the Impact of Corruption on GDP Per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)a
Dependent variable: rgdpl22006
Regional dummies no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no
Panel A: OLS estimates
cci2006 10.582*** 9.223*** 8.547*** 11.182*** 10.119*** 9.637*** 11.062*** 9.644*** 10.238***
(0.766) (0.807) (0.901) (0.982) (0.857) (0.993) (1.147) (0.950) (0.567)
fh_rol -0.435* -0.523**
(0.233) (0.253)
logh_polcon5 -5.265 -8.811** -4.856 -8.671**
(4.540) (3.933) (4.477) (3.946)
logproc_compl 2.295 2.092 2.741 2.493
(2.169) (2.164) (2.397) (2.386)
logdistcr -1.148 -0.505 -0.309
(0.794) (0.555) (0.545)
logelev -1.288 -0.859 -0.901
(1.022) (0.717) (0.745)
lp_protmg80 -0.070* -0.009 -0.003
(0.036) (0.048) (0.046)
Observations 186 186 156 122 122 178 119 119 119
R2 0.569 0.629 0.663 0.811 0.806 0.633 0.814 0.808 0.793
F -test cci2006 = 9.223, p 0.078 1.000 0.454 0.049 0.298 0.677 0.112 0.659 0.076
Panel B: TSLS estimates (corruption endogenous), second stage
cci2006 10.760*** 8.706*** 8.613*** 10.480*** 10.059*** 9.969*** 15.062*** 11.436*** 14.606***
(1.124) (1.269) (1.363) (3.216) (1.563) (1.888) (5.239) (1.972) (1.968)
fh_rol -0.115 -1.061
(0.665) (1.080)
logh_polcon5 -9.545 -9.901 -8.617 -12.346**
(6.752) (6.884) (5.666) (6.056)
logproc_compl 4.072 3.835 8.627** 7.115**
(3.273) (2.763) (4.056) (2.952)
logdistcr -1.476 -0.172 0.511
(1.267) (1.098) (0.757)
logelev -0.304 -1.980* -1.902
(1.127) (1.112) (1.167)
lp_protmg80 -0.067 -0.075 -0.050
(0.067) (0.092) (0.070)
Observations 79 79 75 71 71 78 69 69 69
R-squared 0.669 0.714 0.726 0.811 0.810 0.724 0.816 0.819 0.800
Kleibergen–Paap F 68.11††† 48.12††† 48.37††† 7.595 23.63††† 30.99††† 3.314 16.50†† 17.02††
Cragg–Donald F 51.16††† 30.77††† 36.80††† 5.330 15.69†† 20.65††† 3.511 11.90†† 13.82††
OID p-value 0.117 0.613 0.899 0.367 0.367 0.701 0.350 0.270 0.248
F -test cci2006 = 8.706, p 0.068 1.000 0.946 0.581 0.387 0.504 0.225 0.166 0.003
Robust Hausman test, p 0.725 0.348 0.561 0.710 0.584 0.723 0.786 0.938 0.551
Notes: OLS and second stage TSLS estimates. Dependent variable is real GDP per capita in 2006 from PWT. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. In all columns of Panel B, corruption is instrumented with Hofstede’s power distances (PDI) and individualism (IDV). Constant
included in all regressions. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. †,††,††† indicate TSLS size distortions of a
maximum of 20%, 15%, and 10%, respectively.
a Instead of the control variables included in column (7), the corresponding principal components are included. The principal components are
based on the principal components analysis performed in Web Appendix A2.
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In column (1), control of corruption is the only explanatory variable, exerting a
significant and positive impact on GDP per capita, meaning that the impact of corrup-
tion is negative. Obviously, this simple correlation is biased. First of all; omitted factors
potentially influence both corruption and GDP. A way to eliminate this particular bias
is to use the deep determinants framework to include all factors that affect GDP per
capita. Column (2) includes regional dummies, which should pick up a large share of the
variation in GDP due to geographic differences. Corruption exerts a significant and
negative impact on GDP per capita; taking the OLS estimate of column (2) at face
value, a one unit increase in corruption (standard error 0.99) reduces real GDP per
capita by US$9223. The added-variable plot corresponding to column (2) is shown in
Figure 1. No single group of countries seems to be driving the result.5
Another way to account for omitted variables is two-stage least-squares (TSLS)
estimation, which also eliminates bias owing to reverse causality. TSLS is performed in
panel B of Table 1, which will be commented on in section 5 below.
Columns (3)–(6) of Panel A include the remainder of the three groups of deep
determinants as control variables: geography, institutions, and culture.There are numer-
ous measures of these three determinants, and studies like the present are dependent
on the particular list of control variables. For instance, it is always possible to find some
measure of institutions that does not “kill” the corruption effect, if this is what the
purpose is. To limit the degrees of freedom, this paper has taken all measures of
institutions and culture from the large online dataset gathered by the Quality of
Governance Institute (QOG), they have been included one by one, and the measure
yielding the highest explanatory power to the model has been chosen.
Unfortunately, the QOG dataset does not include geographical measures. Most of
the geographical variation is already accounted for by the regional dummies, but
nevertheless nine additional geographical covariates have been included one by one in
the column (2) regression.
Another choice increasing the degrees of freedom of the empirical researcher is the
choice between taking logs or not. To reduce the degrees of freedom, a choice between
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Figure 1. OLS Estimation of Column (2), Panel A, Table 1
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taking logs or not has been made by using the solution with the highest explanatory
power.6
Geography
The top two geographic measures yielding highest explanatory power when included
one by one in column (2) are also the only two significant measures; log of distance to
coast or river (logdistcr) and log of elevation above sea level (logelev). These are
included in column (3). The estimate of corruption remains significant at the 1% level,
and the size of the estimate is statistically unchanged compared to column (2) (the
same result prevails when including them one by one).
Institutions
Similarly for the measures of institutions, the 25 institutional measures have been
included one by one in regression (2), taking logs whenever the explanatory power was
higher.7 Within each of the three categories of institutions (property rights institutions,
rule of law, and contracting institutions), the measure was picked leaving the model
with the highest explanatory power. Column (4) includes these three dimensions of
institutions: The measure of property rights institutions providing highest R2 was
Henisz’ (2000) political constraints measure, logh_polcon5, higher scores indicating
more political constraint.The rule of law measure that gives highest explanatory power
to the model was a measure by Freedom House, fh_rol, higher scores indicating more
rule of law.8 None of the six measures of contracting institutions turned out significant.
Nonetheless, to complete the model in line with Acemoglu and Johnson (2005),
included in column (4) was the measure of contracting institutions yielding the highest
explanatory power, procedural complexity, logproc_compl, higher scores meaning
more procedural complexity.9 Corruption is still significant at the 1% level, and the
estimate increases above the column (2) estimate. The column (4) results might suffer
from problems of multicollinearity; the rule of law measure, fh_rol, is highly correlated
with both corruption (corr 0.77) and the property rights measure, logh_polcon5 (corr
0.73). Column (5) excludes the rule of law measure, including only property rights
institutions and contracting institutions in line with the analysis by Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005). The explanatory power of the model does not fall much. Excluding
instead property rights institutions and keeping rule of law reduces the explanatory
power even less (not shown), which indicates that maybe the rule of law dimension is
a better fit than property rights institutions. In column (9), the multicollinearity
problem is dealt with by using principal components analysis (described below).
Culture
The QOG dataset includes numerous measures of culture, mostly from the World
Values Survey. All of them have not included, but 31 measures were found of various
religious affiliations, ethnic fractionalization, and also some measures from World
Values Surveys that measure similar culture dimensions as the Hofstede measures.
Only one of all these measures had a significant impact on GDP per capita at the 10%
level when included in the column (2) regression; fraction of Protestants in 1980,
lp_protmg80.10 Column (6) includes fraction of Protestants, leaving the estimate of
corruption and the level of significance unchanged.
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Columns (7) and (8) include all deep determinants, excluding rule of law in column
(8) to reduce the potential multicollinearity issue. Corruption remains negative and
significant at the 1% level.
The main purpose of this part of the analysis is to remove as much as possible of the
variation in GDP per capita caused by the deep determinants.This will both reduce bias
caused by omitted variables, but will also increase the validity of the instruments in the
next part of the analysis.Therefore, the aim is to get rid of the multicollinearity problem
in another way than excluding variables. In Web Appendix A2 a principal component
analysis (pca) is performed to replace the control variables by their principal com-
ponents.11 In short, combinations of the control variables (so-called principal
components) areidentified that explain as large a share of the variation in GDP per
capita as possible and theya areincluded into the analysis in column (9) (corresponds to
column (11) of Table A3 in Web Appendix A2). This method is useful, as the particular
estimate of the control variables is of no interest here—only the estimate on corrup-
tion. Note that the estimate of corruption becomes more precise than in any other
specification and is now higher than the column (2) estimate at the 10% level. The
increased estimate is not due to the smaller sample; when reducing the sample to
the 119 observations, the column (2) estimate drops to 8.703. Hence, it seems that the
omitted factors in the column (2) regression are driving down the corruption estimate,
making corruption seem less severe.
Note that the R2 of columns (7), (8), and (9) reaches as high as 81%, which is high for
cross-country regressions.
5. Identification
Obviously, the estimates in Panel A of Table 1 may be biased by endogeneity. The level
of GDP per capita might influence corruption and richer countries have more
resources to combat corruption (e.g. Gundlach and Paldam, 2009). Alternatively GDP
could have a similar effect on any of the other dimensions of institutions, which will also
bias the estimate of corruption.
This paper has attempted to solve the endogeneity problem exploiting the idea
that corruption is affected by deeply rooted cultural values (Rose-Ackerman, 1999;
Treisman, 2000; Licht et al., 2007). Two dimensions of culture in particular seem to
be impacting the tendency to be corrupt—dimensions concerning individualism and
hierarchy.
Intrumental Variable (IV) Strategy
Individualism distinguishes between collectivist societies, where people attach great
importance to their social networks, and individualist societies, where the individuals’
rights and responsibilities are in focus (Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 1999). A collectivist
orientated culture values tightly knit relations in which people expect their social group
to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. When allocating resources, a
public official favors his own social group in return for a share of the benefits. In
relation to this, Rose-Ackerman (1999) observed that (p. 98) “He [the public official]
may do this not only because he cares for them [the social group], but also because they
care about him and will be less likely than strangers to reveal the corrupt deal or renege
on the agreement. The interdependency of utilities reduces the risks to both particip-
ants.” Decisions made in more collectivist societies are, ceteris paribus, subject to less
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questioning from people within the same social network as the particular decision
maker and the risk of getting caught is lower (Licht et al., 2007).
Several other authors have noted a relationship between individualism and corrup-
tion (Husted, 1999 for an overview). Hooper (1995) linked the tendency to favor one’s
ingroup to corruption in Spain. Banfield (1958) saw a connection between the “amoral
familiarism” (favoritism for family members) of a small village in Italy and the tend-
ency for its public office holders to accept bribes.
The other culture dimension, Hofstede’s “power distance” measure, focuses on
the degree to which inequality in the distribution of power is accepted and expected
in a society. Hofstede notes that larger power distances in a society mean fewer
checks and balances on the use of power, and thereby more corruption. He under-
lines this idea by a credited statement by Lord Acton, a 19th century British
historian: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”12 In
societies, where power is expected and accepted to be distributed unequally,
people tend to be less critical toward decisions made by authorities. This reduces
transparency and means that authorities in high power distance societies are faced
with lower costs of corruption—in terms of the risk of getting caught—compared
with societies where equal distribution of power is expected and where people in
power are kept accountable by a critical populace. Takyi-Asiedu (1993) has linked
power distances to corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. He found that in high power
distance countries, “scandals involving people in authority are, almost always, covered
up as long as they remain in power.” Treisman (2000) argued that in places where
more hierarchical religions prevail, critical positioning towards people in power is
rarer.
Based on this reasoning, Hofstede’s two culture measures individualism (IDV) and
power distances (PDI) are used as instruments for corruption in equation (1). Figure 2
provides the simple scatterplots of CORRUPT vs IDV and PDI, showing the expected
relationships: Countries with more individualism or smaller power distances tend to be
less corrupt.
IV Estimation
Panel B of Table 1 shows the TSLS estimates of the same regressions as in panel A.The
difference between the two panels is that corruption in Panel B is instrumented with
the Hofstede culture dimensions of power distance and individualism.
As a test of whether the instruments are weak, the Kleibergen–Paap F statistic
is used, which is the heteroskedasticity robust generalization of the Cragg–Donald
F statistic (which is again equivalent to the first stage F statistic in the case
of one endogenous regressor). There has still not been generated critical values
for the Kleibergen–Paap F statistic, so it is custom to use the critical values
for the Cragg–Donald F statistic, available from Stock and Yogo (2005). For com-
parison, the Cragg–Donald F statistic is also provided in the tables. It is indicated
whether the weak instrument test statistic is above or below the critical values
provided by Stock and Yogo (2005). Specifically, the TSLS maximal size distortionis
used, which provides the most binding critical values, compared with TSLS bias.
Stock and Yogo (2005) provide maximum size distortions of 10%, 15%, 20%, and
25%.
In column (1), where corruption is the only explanatory variable, the Kleibergen–
Paap F statistic equals 68, which is well above the highest critical value of 19.93. Hence,
IDV and PDI are strong instruments for corruption.
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Panel B of Table 1 also provides the p-value of the OID test, which tests whether
corruption is the only channel through which the instruments influence GDP per
capita. This is a test of low power and it should not be relied upon independently.
Interestingly, in column (1) we can only accept at the 12% level that the two culture
dimensions only influence GDP per capita through corruption. This is a very low level
of acceptance and it supports the suspicion that there might exist other channels
through which these dimensions of culture influence GDP per capita or that there
might be some excluded factors influencing both culture and GDP. This points to the
importance of including other deep determinants of economic productivity. Indeed, the
OID p-value increases to 61.3% in column (2), where the regional dummies are
included, indicating that the problem of exclusion restrictions might be solved by just
including these dummies. Again, the test has low power, and we continue by operating
within the framework of deep determinants.
Adding other geography variables in column (3) does not alter the size or level of
significance of the corruption estimate compared to the column (2) estimate. Adding
the remaining dimensions of institutions in column (4) makes the instruments weak,
inflating the standard errors and potentially biasing the estimates. Limited maximum
likelihood (LIML) estimation is more robust to weak instruments. When using LIML
estimation instead (not shown), the instruments become fairly strong (critical value of
15% LIML size distortion is 5.33) and the corruption estimate is 10.45 (standard error
3.35), significant and unchanged compared with column (2).
Again, the column (4) estimate might be biased because of multicollinearity between
rule of law and both corruption and property rights institutions. When excluding the
rule of law measure in column (5), the culture instruments are again strong and the
estimate of corruption is unchanged compared to column (2).
The instruments remain strong in column (6), where the culture measure, fraction of
Protestants, is included and the estimate of corruption is unchanged compared to the
column (2) regression.
Columns (7) and (8) include all deep determinants simultaneously. The instruments
remain fairly strong in column (8), where rule of law is excluded. The corruption
estimate remains significant at the 1% level and statistically not different from the
estimate in column (2), albeit it is numerically somewhat higher.
Again, use is made of principal component analysis to produce principal components
that span the entire set of control variables, solving the multicollinearity problem and
increasing the precision of the corruption estimate. The analysis is performed in Web
Appendix A2 and the significant principal components are included in column (9) of
Table 1. The instruments are fairly strong and the corruption estimate increases above
the column (2) estimate. When running the column (2) regression on the column (9)
sample, the corruption estimate is unchanged at 8.729. Hence the increase is not due to
sample differences.
The heteroskedasticity robust Hausman test cannot reject that the estimate of cor-
ruption is the same as that produced by OLS. That is, there does not seem to be a
problem of endogeneity.
To sum up, corruption exerts a statistically significant and negative impact on pro-
ductivity levels across countries in the samples studied. The effect is economically
significant. Taking the lowest estimate (column (3), Panel A, Table 1), a one unit
reduction in the level of corruption increases the level of GDP per capita by US$8547.
Within this sample of 156 countries, the control of corruption index runs from -1.83 in
Somalia to 2.56 in Finland. Hence, a one unit reduction of corruption amounts to 22.8%
of the entire interval. On the same sample, GDP per capita runs from a low of US$369
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in Liberia to a peak of US$77,242 in Qatar. Hence, an increase of US$ 8547 amounts to
11.1% of the interval. This means that reducing corruption in a country with a fifth of
what is possible can increase this country’s GDP per capita by more than 10%. Taking
instead the highest corruption estimate from column (9) of Table 1, panel B, a one unit
reduction in the level of corruption increases the level of GDP per capita by
US$14,606. Within this sample of 69 countries, the control of corruption index runs
from -1.32 in Bangladesh to 2.56 in Finland. Hence, a one unit reduction of corruption
amounts to 25.8% of the interval. On the same sample, GDP per capita runs from a low
of US$887 in Tanzania to a peak of US$49,391 in the United Arab Emirates. Hence, an
increase of US$14,606 amounts to 30.1% of the interval. While being large, the effect is
not implausibly large.
Robustness: Other Endogenous Regressors
The remaining dimensions of institutions could impose other problems of endogeneity,
biasing the estimate of interest. In Table 2 therefore, instruments are included for the
remaining dimensions of institutions; property rights institutions, rule of law, and con-
tracting institutions. The instruments meant for corruption remain PDI and IDV
throughout. Since the instruments for the remaining institutions are somewhat weaker,
LIML estimation is used instead of TSLS.13
Property rights institutions Column (1) of Table 2 includes property rights institutions
and uses Albouy’s (2012) corrected version of Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) instrument for
property rights institutions, settler mortality, together with urbanization rates from
1500, also suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2001).The number of observations drops to 27
and the instruments become extremely weak, producing huge standard errors and
making all the estimates unreliable. In column (2) the same instruments are kept, but
another measure of property rights institutions is used, namely the preferred measure
used by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005); constraint on executive (p_xconst). This
measure produced the second highest explanatory power of the model when the
measures of property rights institutions were included one by one in the column (2)
regressions of Table 1. The instruments become strong. The critical value for the weak
instrument test provided by Stock and Yogo (2005) for two endogenous variables and
four instruments based on LIML size distortions of a maximum of 10% is 4.7 < 9.6
(Kleibergen–Paap F statistic). The estimate of corruption remains highly significant
and not numerically different from the OLS estimate in column (2) of Table 1. The
estimate of property rights institutions is insignificant.
Rule of law Column (3) includes the rule of law measure, fh_rol, and introduces as
instrument another culture dimension identified by Hofstede, uncertainty avoidance
index (UAI). The UAI focuses on the level of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity
within a society. It indicates to what extent people feel comfortable in unstructured
situations. Unstructured situations are novel, unknown, surprising, different from usual.
Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict
laws and rules, safety, and security measures.Therefore, it is expectedthat countries with
high UAI would have better rule of law institutions, which proves to be the case. The
instruments are fairly strong (above the 15% size distortion critical value) and the
estimate of corruption remains unchanged. The estimate of rule of law is insignificant.
Contracting institutions Column (4) includes the last dimension of institutions, con-
tracting institutions, instrumented with a dummy capturing French legal origin,
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suggested by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). The instruments become weak and the
estimates unreliable (the same is the case using English legal origin etc.).Therefore the
instrument for contracting institutions, French legal origin, is included instead directly
into the regressions in column (5). The idea is that French legal origin captures at least
some of the variation in contracting institutions.14 This makes the instruments for
corruption strong and the estimate of corruption is unchanged compared to column (2)
in panel B of Table 1.
Columns (6) and (7) include the property rights institutions and rule of law measures,
respectively together with the French legal origin dummy, producing strong instru-
ments (not so strong for rule of law) and unchanged estimate of corruption. Adding
geography to the pool of controls produces weak instruments in the regression with
property rights institutions (not shown), but strong instruments in the regression with
rule of law (column 8) and statistically unchanged estimate of corruption (albeit it falls
somewhat in absolute value). Column (9) adds the last deep determinant, culture, which
produces fairly strong instruments. Column (10) includes the instruments for property
rights institutions and rule of law directly into the regression, producing strong instru-
ments and unchanged estimate of corruption.15 Column (11) includes the three
significant principal components produced from a principal components analysis of the
control variables in column (10). The estimate of corruption becomes again more
precise and is not different from the Table 1, column (2) estimate.
Robustness: Instrument Exogeneity
The Hofstede dimensions of culture that are used as instruments for corruption, IDV
and PDI, are measured 30 years before corruption and GDP, and it is therefore not
possible for either corruption or GDP to have an effect on the instruments. Further,
since Hofstede constructed the measures from a survey of a very similar group of
people, IBM workers, the measures should be independent of demographic differences
etc. across countries. Nevertheless, one may still worry that some omitted factors
influence GDP and culture. There are many factors influencing individuals’ inherited
cultural beliefs, but omitting these will only bias the results if these factors also influ-
ence GDP per capita. Using the deep determinants framework, it was hoped to be able
to include all factors with a bearing on GDP. If this was successful, there is no reason to
worry about instrument endogeneity, but if the deep determinants framework is wrong
or if the measures are systematically biased, factors could have been omitted that
influence both culture and GDP, invalidating the instruments.
It can be testest empirically whether IDV is exogenous in relation to GDP per capita,
since there is an instrument for IDV. Licht et al. (2007) argued that less individualist
cultures have a tendency to drop the pronoun (I, you, he, she, etc.), since the individual
is less important in these cultures and therefore it does not matter whether it was he, she
or I who did this and that.They document that a dummy equal to one if the country has
dropped the pronoun is a strong instrument for IDV. Table 3 shows the results from the
TSLS estimation of IDV on GDP per capita, using pronoun drop as an instrument for
IDV. No control variables are included in column (1), and pronoun drop is a strong
instrument for IDV (F = 62 > 16.38, the 10% critical value with one instrument). The
Robust Hausman test cannot reject that IDV is exogenous in relation to GDP per capita.
It seems unlikely that pronoun drop influences GDP per capita through other chan-
nels than culture, but just to make sure, the exogenous deep determinants of GDP per
capita are included in columns (3) and (4). IDV remains exogenous in relation to GDP
per capita.
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Unfortunately, there is no instrument for PDI. Instead, as a last check of instrument
exogeneity, Table 4 shows that IDV and PDI explain a significant share of the variation
in GDP per capita (columns 1–3), but that the impact of IDV and PDI goes away once
corruption is controlled for (columns 4–6). this is taken as indicating that the impact of
culture works only through corruption.The same pattern emerges when including IDV
and PDI separately (not shown).
5. Conclusion
This paper provides an estimate of the impact of corruption on economic productivity
levels.The motivation for doing so is that the estimate from Mauro’s (1995) study is still
the estimate referred to in the literature, despite the well-known econometric short-
comings of the analysis. This attempt at overcoming these shortcomings starts with
providing new strong instruments for corruption.
The hypothesis is that more hierarchical cultures that focus more on loyalty towards
one’s social group than the individual’s own responsibility, are more prone to become
corrupt compared with more individualist and egalitarian cultures.This is supported by
the empirics. Further, these dimensions prove to be strong instruments for corruption
in the regressions on GDP per capita.
Table 3. Robustness: Testing Instrument Exogeneity (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second stage TSLS estimates, dependent variable: rgdpl22006
idv 0.381*** 0.371*** 0.389*** 0.330***
(0.068) (0.082) (0.099) (0.116)
logdistcr -1.758* -1.924**
(0.980) (0.952)
logelev -1.216 -1.173
(2.057) (2.067)
lp_protmg80 0.059
(0.067)
Regional dummiesa no yes yes yes
First stage estimate of pronoun, dependent variable: idv
pronoun -35.913*** -21.666*** -18.942** -20.502**
(4.558) (7.094) (7.150) (7.739)
OLS estimate of idv, corresponding to TSLS regressions
idv 0.352*** 0.333*** 0.356*** 0.332***
(0.043) (0.049) (0.050) (0.052)
Observations 69 69 66 66
R2 0.375 0.413 0.550 0.560
Kleibergen–Paap F 62.08††† 17.8††† 15.68†† 9.858††
Cragg–Donald F 74.44††† 39.88††† 31.29††† 19.38†††
Robust Hausman test, p 0.537 0.562 0.667 0.981
Notes: TSLS estimates (endogenous variable: idv). Dependent variable is real GDP per capita in 2006 from
PWT. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant included in all regressions. *,**,*** indicate signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. †,††,††† indicate TSLS size distortions of a maximum of
20%, 15%, and 10%, respectively.
a Owing to singleton dummies, the regional dummies are gathered into larger groupings: SOA+EAP,
SSA+MENA, NA+LAC, and ECA.
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However, one could imagine that these dimensions are correlated with other deep
factors that influence productivity levels. Therefore, the reliability of the estimates
hinges on inclusion of additional deep determinants of GDP per capita; geography
and the remaining dimensions of both institutions and culture. To reduce the degrees
of freedom arising when choosing between the numerous measures of these deep
determinants, this paper is restricted by including all measures from an online dataset
by Teorell et al. (2009) encompassing variables from the central research in the field.
After including these factors, the instruments remain strong and the impact of cor-
ruption on GDP per capita remains statistically and economically significant and
negative.
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Notes
1. Some authors argue that trade should also belong with these deep determinants. However,
trade can be viewed as belonging to the more proximate factors, being itself affected by both
institutions, geography, and culture.
2. de Vaal and Ebben (2011) showed in a theoretical model that the impact of corruption on
growth depends on the institutional framework. This speaks for including an interaction term
between corruption and institutions, which could form a basis for future research.
3. Web Appendices A1 and A2 are available on the author’s webpage.
4. See also his webpage: www.geert-hofstede.org
5. Removing the two countries Qatar and Luxembourg reduces the corruption point estimate
from 9.2 to 8.4, which is not a statistically significant difference.
6. Of course, logs were not taken where it does not make sense, e.g. indexes and dummies.
7. Seven of the 25 measures turned out to exert a significant impact on GDP per capita: va2006,
logbti_prp, logbti_rol, fh_rol, logh_polcon3, logh_polcon5, and p_xconst (see Web Appendix A1).
Including all measures gives an estimate of corruption of 9.7 with a t-statistic of 5. 6. That is, no
change of the results. One could use principal components analysis and insert the principal
components into the regression instead of the variables one by one. However, the problem is that
the variables do not have enough observations in common.
8. The estimate of rule of law is negative, but the raw correlation between GDP and rule of law
is positive as one would expect. The negative estimate might reflect that countries that already
have good institutions (in terms of low corruption, low political constraints, and low procedural
complexities) might not benefit from more rule of law.
9. If instead the measure of contracting institutions from column (4) is excluded, the estimate of
corruption increases from 11.2 to 11.6.
10. Additional measures of culture turned out significant when excluding the regional dummies,
though. This finding underlines the importance of regional dummies and indicates that these
culture measures capture nothing more than regional differences.
11. The author thanks an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
12. Lord Acton made his statement in a letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton dated 5 April 1887.
13. A Monte Carlo study done by Flores-Lagunes (2007) suggests that LIML does at least as well
as alternatives. LIML is less precise than TSLS, but also less biased.
14. When only regressing contracting institutions on GDP and instrumenting with French legal
origin, the instrument is strong, suggesting that countries with French legal origin indeed have
more procedural complexities.
15. Note that settler mortality is not included. Including this variable in column (10) reduces the
number of observations to 26 and produces weak instruments.
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